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INTRODUCTION
If it’s not “broke,” don’t fix it—or maybe do. In the realm of
property insurance, standard replacement-cost policy language is being
hotly contested, leaving many insureds wondering what their property
insurance policies actually cover. The policy itself reads that the
insurer will cover “direct physical loss to covered property,” and yet,
debate over the interpretation of this simple sentence has reached the
Seventh Circuit. In cases of partial property damage, insurers seek to
pay to replace only what they must—the damaged property and
nothing more. Insureds, however, fear such replacements will leave
them with property that is aesthetically mismatched, as the brand-new
materials amid undamaged, older materials might cause their property
to decrease in value. However, remedying this concern is no small
matter: the price of beauty can cost insurers with this particular
replacement-cost policy language millions more than perhaps what
they originally bargained for.1 The question then remains—should
*J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. Communications, Moody Bible Institute, May 2016.
1
According to a March 2019 analysis by State Farm, damage caused by wind
and hailstorms “cost State Farm and its policyholders more than $2.7 billion in
2018,” and “Colorado was the state with the most wind/hail losses, followed by
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such a property insurer be required to replace undamaged property in
order to achieve aesthetic “matching”? The Seventh Circuit’s recent
opinion in Windridge of Naperville Condominium Association v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company2 answered this question
in favor of coverage for the insured.
On May 20, 2014, a strong hail and wind storm greatly damaged
buildings owned by Windridge of Naperville Condominium
Association (“Windridge”).3 Specifically, the storm directly damaged
the aluminum siding on the south and west sides of Windridge’s
buildings, equating to a multi-million dollar loss.4 Windridge filed a
claim with its insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company
(“PIIC”), for payment to replace the aluminum siding on all sides of
its storm-affected buildings covered by the policy.5 PIIC only agreed
to pay for the replacement of the damaged aluminum siding on the
south and west sides of the buildings, but not the undamaged siding on
the north and east sides.6 According to PIIC, the relevant insurance
policy only required payment for “direct physical loss to covered
property,” and the siding on the north and east sides did not experience
any such loss or damage.7 Windridge argued that its current aluminum
siding was no longer available, and thus, any replacement siding
would not match the undamaged siding.8 Additionally, Windridge
Texas, Illinois, Minnesota and Missouri.” INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-hail.
2
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1036 (7th Cir. 2019).
3
Id.
4
Id. Although the insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, agreed
to pay $2.1 million to Windridge for the damage to the south and west sides,
Windridge sought approximately $3.5 million in replacement costs for the siding of
all four sides of all buildings in their entirety. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant
(“PIIC Brief”) at 8, Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem.
Ins.Co., No. 1:18-cv-2103 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018).
5
Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1037.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1036.
8
Id.
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claimed that buildings with two elevations consisting of replacement
siding and two elevations consisting of undamaged siding would result
in a mismatched appearance that would not make it “whole.”9
One interpretation of Windridge’s replacement-cost policy might
suggest that PIIC must pay to replace only the specific panels of siding
that were damaged, while another interpretation might suggest that
PIIC must pay to replace all of the siding on the affected buildings in
order to restore the buildings’ uniform appearance.10 Yet another
interpretation might suggest that PIIC pay to replace the siding on the
buildings’ affected sides, each side being considered separately for
damage.11 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Northern
District of Illinois’s decision, which interpreted the policy as covering
replacement siding on all four sides of all the buildings.12
Part I of this note explores the construction of general
replacement-cost policy language and the effect of its oftenoverwhelming ambiguity. Part II of this note provides an overview of
the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Windridge of Naperville
Condominium Association v. Philadelphia Insurance Company,
highlighting its analysis of the particular replacement-cost policy
language at issue. Part III analyzes other courts’ approaches in
interpreting similar replacement-cost policy language, evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of those arguments. Finally, part IV
examines the impact that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Windridge
will have in Illinois and throughout the country.

9

Id.
Id. at 1040.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1036.
10
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PART I: BACKGROUND
Replacement Cost Policy Construction
About 70 million people have homeowner’s insurance.13 Common
to most property insurance policies is compensation for “actual cash
value” of damaged property.14 Actual cash value allows the insured to
be compensated for the property value lost.15 In Illinois, actual cash
value is measured by the property’s replacement value minus any
depreciation,16 which accounts for wear and tear costs.17 Because
13

Claire Wilkinson, How Many Homes are Insured? How Many are
Uninsured? TERMS + CONDITIONS: INS. INDUSTRY BLOG (October 17, 2019), http://
www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/?p=4339.
14
Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Property
Insurance Provision Permitting Recovery of Replacement Cost of Property, 1
A.L.R.5th 817 (1992).
15
As one commentator has noted, “[a]lthough the term actual cash value is
found in many property insurance policies,” and the “generally-accepted meaning of
the term” is replacement cost less depreciation, “it is quite common for the phrase
not to be defined in [property insurance] policies.” Johnny Parker, Replacement Cost
Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 332 n.5 (1999).
16
Depreciation in the insurance context refers to a decrease in the value of the
property based on factors such as age, condition, and usefulness. See Depreciation,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
17
Carey v. Am. Family Brokerage, Inc., 391 Ill. App. 3d 273, 281 (1st Dist.
2009) (in Illinois, “in arriving at ‘actual cash value’ a deduction must be made from
replacement cost to account for depreciation . . .”). Outside of Illinois, such as in
Iowa, actual cash value is interpreted as being “fair market value.” See Gustafson v.
Cent. Iowa Mut. Ins. Ass’n., 277 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1979). In other states, such
as New York, actual cash value is interpreted under the “broad evidence rule,” which
essentially allows the trier of fact to consider market value of the property at the time
of the loss; however, Illinois rejects both the “fair market value” and “broad
evidence rule” approaches to interpreting actual cash value. See Carey, 391 Ill. App.
3d at 281 (“Illinois courts have rejected both the ‘market value’ and the ‘broad
evidence’ tests, instead applying the aforementioned ‘replacement cost less
depreciation’ test in determining the actual cash value of damaged property.”); see
also C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 208 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1055 (5th Dist.
1991) (“While we are aware that other States have adopted a ‘broad evidence’ rule
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actual cash value causes the insured to bear the loss of depreciation,
replacement-cost coverage was created to alleviate this problem.18
Replacement-cost coverage allows “recovery for the actual value of
the property at the time of loss, without deduction for deterioration,
obsolescence, and similar depreciation of the property’s value.”19 In
other words, replacement-cost provisions allow the insured to receive
an amount equal to that which would be required to replace the lost
items.20 Similar to actual cash value, replacement-cost coverage will
apply after a certain deductible is met.21 Although policy language
may provide otherwise, most insurance policies only allow claims for
actual cash value until repairs to the damaged property are made, at
which point insurers will accept claims for replacement-cost value.22
For example, consider the insured who gets a roof that costs him
$10,000. Let us assume the insured has a $1,000 deductible and that
every year the roof depreciates in value about $1,000. After 5 years, a
hailstorm damages the insured’s roof. Using actual cash value,
because the roof is 5 years old, it is now only worth $5,000, and after
paying the deductible, the insured is out about $6,000. However, under
replacement-cost coverage, assuming the insured’s met his deductible,
the insured could recover the cost to build a new roof of similar
quality to the $10,000 roof. This approach only leaves the insured out
$1,000.

which would permit the introduction of market value evidence, we decline to adopt
such a rule.”) (internal citations omitted).
18
See generally, Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance § 1661.
19
Koenders, supra note 14 at pin cite. (emphasis added).
20
As an example of the different amounts that can be found using different
valuation methods, Windridge’s supporting memorandum shows an appraisal award
for $2,940,000.00 for replacement-cost value of the siding as opposed to of
$2,352,005.92 for actual cash value of the siding. Plaintiff-Appellee’s Suppl.
Memo.at 4,Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 182103 (7th Cir. April 3, 2019), ECF No. 44.
21
See Koenders, supra note 14 at *7.
22
But see Nicastro v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 148 A.D.3d 1737,
1738 (4th Dep’t 2017) (finding that language regarding the timing of bringing
replacement claims ambiguous because the policy failed to define the term “claim”).
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Ironically, “[t]he difference between ‘replacement cost’ and
‘actual cash value’ may be one of the few aspects of property
insurance coverage that is actually explained to consumers by
insurance agents.”23 Although as a general matter replacement-cost
policies seem to provide better coverage, the insured’s premiums are
often higher,24 the policy generally requires a homeowner to insure at
least 80% of the actual replacement cost of their home before getting a
replacement cost settlement,25 and getting the insurer to actually pay to
replace damaged property is a process within itself.26
One issue involving replacement-cost policies is the timing of the
replacement.27 Some replacement-cost policies contain provisions that
require the insured to “‘commence’ repair or replacement of the
insured property within a certain timeframe [and] will generally be
upheld although it will not be interpreted as requiring that the repairs
be completed within that timeframe.”28 Other policies only require that
repairs or replacements be done in a “reasonable” amount of time.29
Typically, the policy will have a provision stating that the insurer is
not liable for more than actual cash value of the damaged property
until the repair or replacement has taken place.30 Additionally, the
policy may include a provision that allows the insured the option to
23

Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1263, 1274 n.39 (2011).
24
See Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015).
25
See e.g., Bardi v. Farmers Fire Ins. Co., 687 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (App. Div.
1999).
26
See generally Koenders, supra note 14 (“Matching issues are frequently
problematic . . . .”).
27
2 JAMES L. KNOLL, INSURING REAL PROPERTY § 25.04 (LexisNexis Matthew
Bender 2019).
28
Id. (emphasis added).
29
Id.
30
See Tamco Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1963)
(recognizing that the endorsement policy language— “any loss unless and until the
damaged or destroyed property is actually repaired”— had to be met before the
insurer was liable for any loss).
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collect the actual cash value of the damaged property in exchange for
foregoing her right to later make a claim for replacement costs.31 “Due
diligence” in completing repairs is usually required, which has been
interpreted to cover periods anywhere from ten months to a full year.32
Another issue regarding replacement-cost policies that continues
to occur involves properly determining the scope of coverage,
particularly when there is only partial damage to property. In Illinois,
the insured has the initial burden to prove that the loss is covered, and
then the insurer will have the burden to combat such argument by
asserting that a limitation or exclusion in the policy applies.33
Even as far back as 1983 in Mastin v. Sandy & Beaver Ins. Co.,
the issue regarding scope of coverage was prevalent.34 In Mastin, the
insured’s home was damaged by a storm, which was a covered hazard
under the policy, and it was necessary to cut a hole in the kitchen floor
to repair the damage done to the plumbing.35 After the other repairs
were made, the insurer only paid to patch the kitchen floor, and the
insured wanted the entire kitchen floor replaced.36 The court found
that the floor could not be “repaired” if such an obvious patch was left,
and therefore, replacement was necessary.37 In its reasoning, the court
31

See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 78C 3576, 1979
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7969, *4-5 (December 14, 1979) (applying Illinois law)
(a replacement-cost policy indicated that if the full cost of repair was more than
$1,000 or more than 5 percent of the total amount of insurance covering the damaged
property, the insurer was not liable until the actual repair work was completed;
however, the insured’s decision to disregard this election would not affect the
insured’s right to make a further claim within 180 days after the loss because the
court viewed the insurer as bearing the risk of increased construction costs, including
increased costs accruing during litigation concerning the meaning of that provision).
32
Koenders, supra note 14, at *2a, *3.
33
Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill.2d 446, 453 (2009) (stating that “the burden
in on the insured to prove that its claim falls within the coverage of an insurance
policy” and “[o]nce the insured has demonstrated coverage, the burden then shifts to
the insurer to prove a limitation or exclusion applies.”).
34
Mastin v. Sandy & Beaver Ins. Co., 432 N.E.2d 332, 332 (1983).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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placed emphasis on the fact that the insurer presumably inspected the
kitchen floor, was aware that the access to the plumbing was through
the kitchen floor, and knew the kitchen floor might be expensive to
replace.38
Other courts have distinguished Mastin where damage can be
limited to occurring to only a particular area.39 In St. Paul Fire &
Marine Co. v. Darlak Motor Inns, Inc., an insured had six hotel rooms
damaged as a result of a fire.40 The insured wanted its insurer to cover
the cost of redecorating rooms on the third floor, which were
undamaged by the fire, in order for all its rooms to maintain
“continuous décor.”41 The court determined that in this case, the
insurer was not merely “patching” a problem in a deficient manner,
but rather “would have no reason to know that it would have to
redecorate every room on a floor even if only one of those rooms was
damaged.”42 Therefore, the cost of requiring the insurer to redecorate
those undamaged rooms was unwarranted.43
As these case examples demonstrate, replacement-cost policies
can be unclear when partial damage to property occurs and the parties
are determining how much property to replace. To eliminate
unexpected costs, insurers, much like PIIC in Windridge, include a
valuation provision that allows them to choose the least expensive
replacement option.44 For example, in Windridge, PIIC agreed to “pay
for direct physical ‘loss’ to Covered Property caused by or resulting
from any of the Covered Causes of Loss” and included the following
valuation provision:45
38

Id.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Co v. Darlak Motor Inns, Inc., No. 3:97-cv-1559,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23283, *2-3 (March 9, 1999).
40
Id.
41
Id. at *17.
42
Id. at *20.
43
Id. at *22.
44
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 2019).
45
Note that all words or phrases that begin with a capital letter generally
indicate that such word or phrase is defined in the insurance policy itself.
39
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7. Valuation
We will determine the value of Covered Property
in the event of “loss” as follows:
a. at replacement cost (without deduction for
depreciation) as of the time of “loss” . . .
1. We will not pay more for “loss” on
replacement costs basis than the least of:
a) The Limit of Insurance applicable to
the lost or damaged property;
b) The cost to replace the lost or
damaged property with other
property:
i. Of comparable material and
quality; and
ii. Used for the same purpose;
or
c) The amount you actually spend that
is necessary to repair or replace the
lost damaged property.46
Based on the policy language cited, PIIC agreed to either replace or
pay to replace the covered property that was damaged by a covered
loss, depending on which option was cheaper.
Additionally, as is typical of most replacement-cost policies, a
loss payment provision is also included.47 Property insurance policies
generally include loss payment provisions to allow the insurer some
flexibility and discretion in the process of compensating the insured
for his loss. Using Windridge’s policy as an example, the loss payment
provision allowed PIIC to choose the least expensive of the following
four options: (1) pay the value of the damaged property; (2) pay the
cost to repair or replace the damaged property; (3) take all or any part

46
47

Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1037.
See id.
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of the property at an agreed or appraised value; or (4) repair, rebuild,
or replace the property with other property of like kind and quality.48
Although option 4—which will repair, rebuild, or replace the
property—is the only option that specifically uses the (words “like
kind and quality,” the Seventh Circuit indicated, the phrase “[o]f
comparable material and quality” was applicable to all the loss
payment provision options.49 The Seventh Circuit recognized that
“regardless of which option Philadelphia Indemnity [chose],
replacement property must be “[o]f comparable material and quality”
and PIIC indicated as much in their valuation statement.50
Option 2, which commonly or usually requires payment for
replacement of the property, is the cheapest option for insurers.51
However, problems arise when computing the replacement cost
amount when, as was the case in Windridge, materials go out of stock
and become unavailable, leaving no exact or identical match on the
market.52 Such issues have left the parties wondering how identical of
a match is required.
Many courts have determined that although an exact match may
not be required, a “reasonable” match is required.53 Courts around the
country tend to vary in defining a reasonable match, but typically the
definition involves replacement that is equal in value and virtually
identical to the undamaged property.54 In Cedar Bluff Townhome
48

Id.
Id. at 1039.
50
Id.
51
Id.; It is, in fact, rare for insurance companies to ever want to choose an
option like (3) or (4) in the policy in Windridge, as these steps essentially turn the
policy into a contract for repair and exposes them to potential liability to others. See
12A STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE §176:41 (3d. ed. 2019).
52
See id. at 1037.
53
See Cedar Bluff Townhome Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Inc. Co., 857
N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 2014).
54
See, e.g., Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co, 464 S.W.3d 529, 532-33 (Mo. Ct.
App. June 23, 2015) (“Considering the definition in full, construed in favor of the
insured to provide the broadest coverage possible, ‘equivalent’ requires that the
replacement [siding] be ‘equal in value’ and ‘virtually identical’”); Hamlet Condo.
49
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Condominium Ass’n v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., over 20
buildings were lightly affected by a hail storm, each building
experiencing damage to less than 2% of its siding.55 Like in
Windridge, the insured in Cedar Bluff claimed that, pursuant to their
replacement cost policy, the insurer should pay to replace the siding on
all four sides of each of their twenty buildings because the current
siding was eleven years old, faded, and would not match any brand
new siding that would replace the damaged panels.56 Interestingly,
while the manufacturer of the insured’s buildings’ siding still made the
same exact siding, the insured argued that such brand new panels
would not match the color of the faded siding.57 The Minnesota
Supreme Court found that the insurer agreed to replace the panels with
“comparable material and quality,” and such a phrase included color
concerns.58 Further, the court held the insurer had to replace the siding
on all twenty buildings to avoid the color mismatch.59
Minnesota is not alone in concluding that replacement-cost
provisions (like in Cedar Bluff) do, in fact, require more than paying
for a merely similar match.60 In Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., a
hailstorm damaged the siding on the insured’s house’s north side.61
Once again, the insured argued that the siding was no longer available
and the insurer was required to recover for the cost of siding on the
entire house.62 The Appellate Court agreed with the insured and
Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2016-cv-305942017, Colo. Dist. LEXIS
1433, *17 (April 12, 2017) (stating replacement-cost policies run the risk of allowing
the insured to be in a better position he was in before the loss and that a reasonable
match under the relevant replacement-cost policy entitled the insured to skimcoating, which provided visually matching stucco).
55
Cedar Bluff Townhome Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Family Mut. Inc. Co., 857
N.W.2d at 291.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 292
58
Id. at 295.
59
Id. at 296.
60
Alessi, 464 S.W.3d at 529.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 530.
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interpreted the phrase “equivalent construction and use” as the
replacement-cost policy calling for replacement “equal in value” and
“virtually identical.”63 It seemed obvious to the court that if the
insured were left with mismatched siding, then the insured’s property
value would have been reduced.64 To the court, the insurers bore the
risk that the insured might end up in a better position than he was in
before the loss: failing to pay anything less than a full replacement of
the siding on the entire house would violate its contractual
obligation.65
In Illinois, phrases such as “of like kind or quality” mean
“sufficient to restore the [property] to its pre-loss condition.”66 In
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., plaintiffs brought suit against
their insurer for failure to replace damaged vehicle parts with nonoriginal equipment manufacturer (“non-OEM”) parts, which allegedly
breached the policy’s coverage to replace damaged property with
materials of “like kind or quality.”67 According to the plaintiffs, the
insurer could only satisfy the policy by “requiring the exclusive use in
repairs of factory-authorized or [original equipment manufacturer]
parts,” as that was the plaintiffs’ original position. 68 The court,
however, found that the policy at issue was not breached by providing
the plaintiffs with non-OEM parts, and that “[c]ommon sense indicates
that an item that is of ‘like kind and quality’ to another is not that very
item, but rather is something of ‘like kind and quality’ to it.”69 The
court supported this statement by pointing to the policy language
which required the insured to pay for replacements that were “better
than like kind and quality,” which suggested that non-OEM parts
could be used and possibly allow the insured to be put in a better

63

Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 532.
65
See id.
66
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 143 (2005).
67
Id. at 112.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 140.
64
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position than it was originally.70 The court agreed with the insurer that
the specific replacement with non-OEM parts did not violate the
policy.71
Thus, policy language inclusive of “like kind or quality” does not
impose any specific standard of part quality.72 Insurers also have no
obligation “to make the property better than it was before”:
[I]f an option is reserved to build or repair and the insurer
elects to do so, it is bound only to put the insured building in
substantially the same state as before the loss but is not bound
to pull down the old walls and rebuild them entirely on
account of a previously existing defect in the foundation; it is
enough if, by incorporating what remains of them, the new
walls are as secure as the old ones were.73
Illinois law is likewise clear that “‘like kind and quality’ means
‘sufficient to restore the [insured] to its pre-loss condition.’”74
Replacement-cost policies in Illinois are seen as providing a “makewhole-remedy,” that “must strive to approximate the situation [the
insured] would have occupied had the [covered loss] not occurred.”75
Although a seemingly simple principle, it is sometimes difficult to
determine what the insured’s pre-loss condition truly was when
dealing with replacement of rare, unavailable (like in Windridge), or
special property.
For example, in FSC Paper Corp. v. Sun Ins. Co., a fire at FSC
Paper Corporation (“FSC”), the insured’s business, burned more than

70

Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
72
22A JOHN BORDEAU, ET AL., ILL. LAW AND PRAC. INSURANCE § 392.
73
12A STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 176:4 (3d. ed. 2019).
74
Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 117.
75
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting FSC Paper Corp. v.
Sun Insurance Co. of New York, 744 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1984)).
71
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12,000 tons of newspaper known as “Special Pack.”76 FSC’s insurer,
Sun Insurance Company of New York (“Sun”) admittedly insured the
loss of the Special Pack, but disagreed with FSC regarding the
replacement cost calculation method.77 The relevant policy stated: “In
case of loss the basis of adjustment for all property covered under this
policy . . . shall be replacement cost at the time and place of loss. . .
.”78 FSC argued it was insured for the historical cost of the paper, as it
was required to continually report to Sun its value of the property that
was at risk under the policy and FSC had continually based its reports
on the historical cost of the paper.79
In FSC, the Seventh Circuit decided that the policy did not
indicate that reported value limited the replacement, and so, depending
on the market price, FSC could potentially recover more or less than
the historical cost, placing the risk on Sun when it issued the policy.80
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its goal stating: “[w]e believe that
FSC’s recovery must be measured in general by the amount it was
reasonably required to expend to put itself in the position it would
have occupied had the fire not occurred,” and as long as FSC made
commercially reasonable purchases to replace the Special Pack, Sun
would be responsible to pay for such purchases.81
Measuring replacement cost can vary according to the specific
language used in the policy, but as a general matter, courts, like in
FSC, have focused on finding out the true cost of replacing the
damaged property—not how the damaged property has been valued in
reports, or that the replacement is now leaving the insured with
property which is less in value.82 The replacement cost policy asks:
76

FSC Paper Corp., 744 F.2d at 1280.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1283.
81
Id.
82
See e.g., Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 781 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 2001) (Replacement cost was measured by the cost to replace the
damaged structure on the same premises).
77
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“what is the cost to replace the damaged property today?” When PIIC
issued its replacement-cost policy to Windridge, it committed to
restore Windridge to its pre-loss condition should any damage occur,
and when PIIC selected option (2) of the loss payment provision, it
committed to providing Windridge with the money to go out and
replace their siding with siding similar in shape, color, and overall
quality.

Appraisal Issues
Typically, property insurance policies allow for an appraisal83 by
experts if the insurer and the insured cannot agree on the amount of
loss, and an appraisal award is typically binding absent any
exceptional circumstances.84 In Windridge, there was certainly much
debate over the valuation of the siding, and whether matching siding
was, indeed, as unavailable as Windridge claimed.85 In Windridge, the
relevant policy included an appraisal provision, which allowed both
Windridge and PIIC to select their own appraiser for valuation of the
property constituting the loss where a dispute was present.86 Both
selected appraisers would then select an umpire, or in the case that the
selected appraisers could not agree, a judge could be requested to
make a determination instead.87 The policy then indicated that each
appraiser would submit their valuation of the property and determine
the amount of loss, and, “[i]f they fail to agree, they will submit their
differences to the umpire” where “[a] decision agreed to by any two
will be binding.”88
83

An appraisal is “the act of estimating or judging the nature of value of
something or someone.” Appraisal, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.com/browse.appraisal?s=t (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
84
See Villas at Winding Ridge v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 942 F.3d 824,
830 (7th Cir. 2019).
85
See Windridge II, 932 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2019).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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While courts have generally determined that the amount of loss is
not dependent on a coverage determination, there is some confusion as
to whether an appraisal can still proceed while coverage issues
continue to exist.89 Windridge originally brought a motion to compel
appraisal on three issues: (1) cost to replace the affected building’s
roof, (2) reimbursement for overhead and profit, and (3) “whether the
aesthetic mismatch is so significant as to constitute ‘damage’, and if
so, assess a loss amount.”90 Although the Northern District of Illinois
viewed the first two issues to be appropriate for appraisal because
there existed a genuine dispute of loss, the court denied arbitration for
the third issue.91
Windridge argued that the interpretation of the third issue was a
question of causation—did the storm actually cause an aesthetic
mismatch?92 For them, the cause of loss could not be separated from
the amount of loss, as the issues were intertwined.93 The district court,
however, considered this an issue of coverage—was the alleged
mismatch a “loss” that was covered under the policy? 94 The district
court would not allow Windridge to proceed with the appraisal process
on this issue until a determination as to coverage was made,95 as such
was the precedent in Illinois.96

89

See generally Runaway Bay Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Cos., 262 F.
Supp. 3d 599, 604 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
90
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10598, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2017).
91
Id. at *11.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Runaway Bay, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 603 Full citation (“Thus, the question of
whether the Policy requires replacement of undamaged property to achieve matching
is not appropriate for appraisal.”).
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Other states, such as Georgia, also prohibit appraisal on
“matching” to be done before a determination of coverage is made.97
The rationale for such process is that appraisals can only resolve
disputed value, and thus, to unnecessarily expand the scope of liability
before coverage is determined is premature.98 Minnesota would
likewise agree that “coverage questions are not for appraisers” and
while appraisers might participate in evaluating the amount of loss,
“they may not construe the policy or decide whether the insurer should
pay.”99
Ironically, in Windridge, once the district court made a
determination of coverage, neither party’s counsel actually knew if
there was matching siding available.100 The only appraisal award,
which agreed with Windridge’s position that no matching siding was
available, was submitted before the district court’s opinion.101 After
ruling in favor of Windridge, the district court, however, specifically
ordered a second appraisal, apparently unconvinced by the first one.102
Nevertheless, PIIC seemed to have conceded at oral argument that no
matching siding was available.103 This admission, coupled with the
district court’s assumption that no matching siding existed, led the
Seventh Circuit to assume the same.104

97

See e.g., Lam v. Allstate Indem. Co., 755 S.E.2d 544, 546 (Ga. App. 2014)
(homeowner could not get an appraisal on matching shingles for roof until coverage
determination was made).
98
See generally id.
99
Trout Brook S. Condo. Ass’n v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 995 F.
Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (D. Minn. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
100
See Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d. 1035, 1038 n.1 (7th Cir. 2019).
101
Id.
102
Id.; see also Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins.
Co., No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2018)
(“Windridge I”) (“Now that the coverage issue has been resolved, appraisal may
proceed on the siding issue”).
103
Windridge II, 932. F.3d at 1038 n.1.
104
See id.
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However, regardless of whether matching siding was available
now, PIIC actually indicated that matching siding was available to
Windridge “for almost a year and a half” after the storm and that
Windridge was liable for not timely taking action.105 Certainly, these
facts only further persuaded the Seventh Circuit that if PIIC truly
wanted to litigate the fact that matching materials were, in fact,
available, they had ample time to do so.106

PART II: ANALYSIS OF WINDRIDGE DECISION
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit made a few
important determinations: (1) the relevant policy language was
ambiguous, requiring interpretation in the favor of the insured; and (2)
each building suffered a “direct physical loss,” as that was the only
way the insured could properly be made whole again.107 Each of these
determinations will be discussed in detail below.
Dealing with Ambiguous Policy Language
The Windridge decision came to the Seventh Circuit based on
diversity jurisdiction, and as there was no contest as to choice of law,
the court properly applied Illinois law, which was the forum state
law.108 “Under Illinois law, construction of insurance policies is a
question of law” subject to contract interpretation principles.109

105

Id. at 1042 n.6.
See id.
107
See id. at 1042.
108
Id. at 1035; see also Santa’s Best Craft, LLC v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying forum state substantive law
and federal procedural law in light of Erie doctrine because no party raised a choice
of law issue).
109
Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Emp’r Ins. Co. of Wausau, 456 F.3d 758,
762 (7th Cir. 2006).
106
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Similarly to how other court evaluate contracts, Illinois courts
scrutinize insurance policies according to the policy language.110
Unlike contract law, however, the remedies available to policyholders
in insurance contexts are often thought to be narrower.111 Scholars
have indicated that policyholders often lack the resources and time to
challenge denials of coverage and end up experiencing greater
economic losses.112 After all, “breaching insurance policies are
incredibly profitable for insurance companies” and this fact alone
raises concern regarding whether the insurance policy sold to the
policyholder is the same policy the policyholder thought he
purchased.113
In an effort to alleviate this concern, the contra proferentem
rationale was born. The contra proferentem doctrine interprets
ambiguously drafted provisions against the drafter.114 Since the drafter
has the power to phrase the policy, he should carry the burden of
making the provisions understandable.115 Insureds and courts both
benefit from incentivizing drafters to write understandable policies.
Illinois courts have also justified the use of this doctrine by
highlighting the purpose of insurance policies—to provide coverage to
the insured.116 Where insureds are thought to have reduced bargaining
power, Illinois law provides an equitable remedy, as “[a]mbiguous
terms are construed strictly against the drafter of the policy and in
favor of coverage.”117 Essentially, this well-known doctrine seeks to

110

See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg, 796 F.3d 773, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015)
(applying Illinois law) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
111
Id.
112
Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance
Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 337
(date)
113
Id.
114
Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1992).
115
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1121 (2006).
116
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 119 (1992).
117
Id.
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“meet the ends of justice” without doing any “violence to the words
used.”118
In Windridge, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged Illinois’ use of
the doctrine, although it did not name the doctrine in its opinion.119
However, before applying the doctrine, the Seventh Circuit needed to
establish whether the policy language was, indeed, ambiguous. The
Seventh Circuit recognized that Illinois courts will consider the policy
ambiguous if such language is “subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.”120 The potential ambiguous terms identified by the
Seventh Circuit were the phrases “direct, physical loss” and “covered
property.”121
Ironically, the potentially ambiguous phrases were actually
somewhat defined in the policy, but unfortunately, even the policy
definitions were vague and not without their own ambiguities.122
Indeed, insurers like PIIC generally provide a “Building and Personal
Property Coverage Form” to specifically narrow the term’s meaning to
the specific addresses listed in such form. According to the policy,
“covered property” included Windridge’s “buildings and structures,”
but whether that definition included the siding on the entire building or
the individual sides of the building the court was yet to decide.123

118

See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 138
(1901) (in reading an ambiguous policy in favor of the insured, the Court merely
states it “interprets the contract so as to do no violence to the words used and yet to
meet the ends of justice.”).
119
“Regardless, the unit of covered property to consider under the policy (each
panel of siding vs. each side vs. the buildings as a whole) is ambiguous as applied to
these facts, so under Illinois law, we favor the interpretation that leads to coverage.”
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. (“Windridge
II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 2019).
120
Id. at 1039.
121
Although according to Illinois law, “the mere failure to define a term in the
policy does not render that term ambiguous.” Id.
122
Id. at 1039-40.
123
See id.
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Ironically, PIIC’s attempt to define such language seemed to make the
language even more ambiguous.124
As Windridge had pointed out, “[r]eplacement cost policies
generally charge higher premiums in exchange for agreeing to repair
or replace with material of like kind and quality,”125 and interpreting
the policy any other way would deprive Windridge of its “contractual
indemnity right.”126 Although PIIC previously asserted that Windridge
was a “sophisticated party” that perhaps could not attempt to rely on
the ambiguity rule in Illinois, PIIC failed to raise this issue in its
opening brief and presented no evidence to support this contention.127
Ultimately the Seventh Circuit determined that “direct physical
loss to covered property” was ambiguous as applied in the case, and
due to adherence to Illinois law, was bound to favor an interpretation
that lead to coverage for the insured.128

Direct, Physical Loss to Covered Property
After establishing that “direct physical loss to covered property”
is ambiguous as applied to the facts at hand, the Seventh Circuit in
Windridge attempted to interpret the phrase itself. Notably, PIIC
emphasized the phrase’s use of “direct” and “physical” in its argument
for narrow policy interpretation.129 PIIC argued that even Windridge’s
own phrasing of the issue before the district court, “[w]hether the
policy covers the need to make an aesthetic match when only certain
124

Id. at 1040.
Id.; Alessi v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 464 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 23, 2015); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg, 796 F.3d 773, 778 (7th
Cir. 2015) (when evaluating policy language, type of insurance and type of risk
undertaken are important to consider).
126
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee (“Windridge Brief”) at 7, Windridge of
Naperville Condo Ass’n v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 1:18-cv-2103 (7th Cir. Jan.
31, 2019).
127
Id. at 7, n.2.
128
Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1039.
129
Id.
125
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parts of the building sustain physical damage and are repaired while
other parts are not,”130 was a blatant acknowledgment that the policy
did not require matching.131 According to PIIC, admitting that the
north and east sides did not sustain physical damage necessarily meant
that coverage for those sides was not available, because after all, the
policy only covers direct physical loss to covered property.132 As
noted by PIIC, Windridge carried the burden of establishing that its
“loss” fell within coverage, and if Windridge could not present
evidence that these north and east sides of the buildings experienced a
direct physical loss, then PIIC was not liable to pay to replace them.133
PIIC further asserted that Windridge’s demand for aesthetic
matching was not the kind of physical damage covered by the
replacement-cost policy.134 PIIC highlighted several cases in the
Northern District of Illinois that showed such a connection was neither
“direct” nor “physical.”135 One such case was Mohr v. American
Automobile Insurance Company136 In Mohr, a hailstorm damaged
portions of shingles on a unique and expensive cedar roof, and there
was debate over whether the entire roof should be replaced or whether
a patchwork effect would be sufficient.137 Ultimately, the court in
Mohr found that the insured could not prove the entire roof would
need to be replaced in order to account for the hail damage (only about
5% of the shingles on the roof were damaged), as the repair job was
130

Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 1 (phrasing the issue as whether
“‘direct physical loss’ to covered property requires an insurer to pay for matching
replacement materials that is not physically damaged. . . .”) (Emphasis added).
131
PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 9.
132
See id.
133
Id. at 15 (“the existence of coverage is an essential element of the insured’s
case and the insured has the burden of proving his loss falls within the terms of his
policy.”) (quoting St. Michael’s Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut.
Ins. Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 107, 113 (1st Dist. 1986)).
134
PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 15.
135
Id. at 16.
136
No. 01 C 3229, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4772, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2004).
137
Id. at *42-43.
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not so complex to make complete replacement necessary and the
“contract [did] not contemplate aesthetic perfection. . . .”138 PIIC
argued that Windridge’s desire for aesthetic matching was likewise not
contemplated in the relevant insurance policy.139
For PIIC, Windridge’s interpretation “would be unduly
burdensome” as well.140 If required to replace all the siding on all of
Windridge’s buildings, PIIC questioned if they would be required to
do the same if only one of Windridge’s buildings sustained siding
damage—they had, after all, a total of 110 buildings.141 Essentially,
PIIC wondered if all the buildings’ siding would have to be replaced if
only one building’s siding was damaged and could not perfectly match
the others. There was also strong concern on PIIC’s part about
extending a “windfall profit” to Windridge—presumably the
undamaged siding on the buildings was weathered and older (since it
was no longer available) at least to some extent, and such a
replacement principle was feared to be never-ending in application.142
Windridge, on the other hand, addressed PIIC’s concerns with an
argument that ultimately was endorsed by the Seventh Circuit and
became the pinnacle of the decision itself—the direct physical loss
from the hailstorm did not occur just to the siding pieces individually
damaged, but rather, the direct physical loss occurred to the building
as a whole.143 As eloquently stated by the District Court, “[w]hile it
would be correct as a matter of ordinary usage to say that the storm
damaged the siding on the building’s south and west elevations, it
would be just as correct to say that the storm damaged the building’s
siding period.”144 To Windridge, if the buildings, as a whole, were
138

Id. at *47.
PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 21.
140
See also Woods Apartments, LLC v. United States Fire Insurance Co., No.
3:11-cv-00041, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105582 (W.D. Ky. July 29, 2013).
141
PIIC Brief, supra note 4, at 18.
142
Id.
143
Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 5.
144
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.,
(“Windridge I”), No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
April 13, 2018).
139
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listed as “covered property,” then any damage to the siding necessarily
affected a direct physical loss to covered property and thus should be
covered by the policy—to break coverage into applying to specific
parts of the buildings, especially when dealing with different sides of
buildings, seemed utterly illogical.145
PIIC fully admitted that the south and west sides experienced a
direct physical loss,146 and, indeed, it paid $2.1 million for the
replacement damaged elevations, suggesting an implicit admission that
the policy at least covered more than just individually damaged pieces
of siding.147 This payment, then, at least covered some aesthetic
appearance. In other words, at the very least, a physical loss to siding
pieces affected the physical appearance of the entire elevation.
Windridge noted several cases in Illinois which also suggested
that physical alteration of buildings’ appearances equated a physical
injury.148 In its brief, Windridge pointed to cases such as Travelers
Insurance Company v. Eljer Manufacturing, Incorporated,149 which
indicated that “‘physical injury’ unambiguously connotes damage to
tangible property causing an alteration in appearance, shape, color or
in other material dimension.”150 Certainly, physical injuries to
property, while often impacting the usefulness of it, also tend to result
in a change in appearance.151 In the words of the district court, a
failure to replace all of the sides of the buildings would leave
Windridge with buildings “suffering from a glaring and profound
flaw.”152
145

Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 1.
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035,1038 (7th. Cir. 2019).
147
See id. at 1037.
148
Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 11.
149
757 N.E.2d 481, 502 (Ill. 2001).
150
Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 11.
151
See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1041 (“The storm altered the appearance of
the buildings such that they were damaged.”).
152
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.,
(“Windridge I”), No. 16 C 3860, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
April 13, 2018).
146
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The Seventh Circuit agreed that “the crux of the issue seems to be
whether this policy’s coverage of damaged property refers to the
smallest unit possible (an individual panel, a single shingle, a single
patch of flooring) or to one larger (the entire façade, the whole roof, a
continuous stretch of flooring).”153 National Presbyterian Church,
Incorporated v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company154 appealed to
the Seventh Circuit as on-point authority in aesthetic mismatch cases,
as the cases that PIIC cited to involved slightly different policy
language or had not determined that no materials were available to
effectuate a “match.”155 In National Presbyterian, the coverage,
valuation, and loss payment provisions were nearly identical.156 The
court in National Presbyterian ultimately determined that, although
only some of the church’s exterior limestone panels were damaged,
the insurer was required to replace all of the limestone panels to ensure
matching.157 Since the Seventh Circuit, like the court in National
Presbyterian, had already found the replacement-cost policy at issue to
be ambiguous, they were looking for a way to interpret the policy as
providing complete coverage.158 Thus, interpreting the policy as
covering the buildings “as a whole” seemed the best interpretation.
Ultimately, much like the District Court had observed, the
Seventh Circuit recognized that “a replacement cost policy, by
definition provides a ‘make-whole’ remedy” and therefore, this
particular replacement-cost policy “must strive to approximate the
situation [Windridge] would have occupied had [the hailstorm] not
occurred.”159 The Seventh Circuit noted Windridge’s buildings all had
matching siding before disaster struck, and they only wished now to

153

Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040.
82 F. Supp. 3d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015).
155
Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See id. (“We face essentially the same issue under the same language and
arrive at the same result.”).
159
Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 10.
154
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have matching siding after disaster struck.160 “Having mismatched
siding on its buildings would not leave Windridge in the same position
it was in before the loss.”161 Certainly, this interpretation was
“common sense” to the court.162 If “no matching replacement siding is
available, [PIIC] must pay to replace all of the siding on all
Windridge’s buildings.”163
Commentary on Making the Insured “Whole” Again
In recent years, the Seventh Circuit’s position in the Windridge
opinion is somewhat of a popular one, albeit derived using standard
contract interpretation principles.164 Through its logical decision, the
Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the need for property insurers to
make clearer the boundaries of their coverage, but it also recognized
the important relationship that aesthetics have had upon property
value.
Aesthetics,165 to be sure, is a subjective idea that is difficult for
courts to logically explain, as philosophers, architects, and particularly
legal scholars have continually struggled with the significance of
aesthetics in relationship to its community.166 In the 1800s, Henry

160

Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1042.
Id.
162
Id. at 1041.
163
Id. at 1042.
164
Considering the states that do discuss “matching” regarding relevant
property insurance provisions, most courts have taken the position that matching is
required. See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040.
165
Aesthetics is defined as “relating to the beautiful as distinguished from the
merely pleasing, the moral, and especially the useful and utilitarian.” Aesthetics,
WEBSTER’S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/aesthetics (last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
166
Randall J. Cude, Beauty and the Well-Drawn Ordinance: Avoiding
Vagueness and Overbreath Challenges to Municipal Aesthetic Regulations, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 853, 853 (1998).
161
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David Thoreau wrote about the importance of beauty in relation to
neighborhood value:
Shall that dirty roll of bunting in the gun-house be all the
colors a village can display? A village is not complete unless
it have these trees to mark the season in it . . . A village that
has them not will not be found to work well. It has a screw
loose, and essential part is wanting . . . A village needs these
innocent stimulants of bright and cheering prospects to keep
off melancholy and superstition.167
As Thoreau pointed out long ago, aesthetics impact society in the
sense that it invokes happiness, an appreciation for change, a desire for
harmony or symmetry, and even an inspiration to create.168 Aesthetics,
then, is something valuable and worth protecting because of its ability
to positively impact communities in these ways and, perhaps further,
give citizens more to enjoy and live for.
Illinois courts view aesthetics as an “element of the public health
safety, and welfare.”169 Other courts, too, have recognized aesthetic
value when posed with questions of design law or when asked to strike
down a certain aesthetic regulation, statute, or ordinance, or even in
recent years when asked to consider if certain aesthetic creations can
become a form of speech protected under the first amendment.170
However, regardless of why aesthetics should be protected, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision recognized that aesthetics do, in fact, affect
property values.171
167

Id.
See Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Instrumental Value of Beauty in the Pursuit
of Justice, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 451, 469 (2006).
169
Champaign v. Kroger Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 498, 510 (4th Dist. 1980).
170
See e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (agreeing that the defendant’s
creation of a custom-made wedding cake is an expressive form of free speech
protected by the first amendment).
171
“Early judicial decisions that upheld aesthetic regulations often did so on
the theory that they preserved property values.” Spkye, supra note 168 at 469.
168
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In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court recognized the harm of
an aesthetic nuisance.172 The Court upheld the use of eminent domain
to remove existing “insanitary or unsightly” buildings and improve the
relevant community’s overall appearance.173 Justice Douglas,
recognizing that aesthetics certainly correlate to depreciation in
property value, wrote:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more
than spread disease and crime and immortality. They may
also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there
. . .They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community
which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which
men turn. . .[T]he concept of public welfare is broad and
inclusive. . . spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.174
In some ways, Justice Douglas seemed to promote aesthetics as a
sort of political goal toward which society should strive. Whether
something is beautiful or not is, after all, a subjective question,175 but a
question that courts have been asked to answer nonetheless.176
Consider copyright, trademark, customs, and tax law—these areas of
law consistently ask judges to evaluate the aesthetic value in an object
and determine whether it is original, merely functional, protectable,

172

348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).
Id. at 33.
174
Id. at 32-33.
175
See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Justice Scalia commenting,
“[f]or the law courts to decide ‘What is Beauty’ is a novelty even by today’s
standards.”).
176
Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 813 (2005).
173
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taxable, etc.177 Aestheticism is so intertwined in every area of law, and
it is difficult for judges to avoid questions pertaining to it altogether.
Insurance law, however, is perhaps an unexpected area of law to
deal with aestheticism, as it is mostly contract interpretation that
dominates. But, as Brian Soucek eloquently mentioned in his article,
Aesthetic Judgment in Law, “[w]hen a house is sold, the contract
ordinarily does not say, ‘Two thousand dollars has been marked off
because the house next door is painted fuchsia.’”178 Indeed, it appeared
to be “common sense” to the Seventh Circuit that Windridge’s
buildings would face a diminution in value if the siding was not
replaced on all of the elevations.179 The zebra striping would certainly
be an eye sore—much like any contract for the sale of a house does
not bother to say something that seems so inherently obvious—a sort
of universally agreed trend of “ugliness” deters people away.
Certainly, “[t]o say that property values in a neighborhood will go
down if a cemetery is built nearby, or if yard signs, or green exterior
paint, or Tudor architecture is allowed is to say that potential buyers
will be aesthetically displeased enough by these choices that their
interest in living in the neighborhood will diminish.”180 The Seventh
Circuit merely applied those principles to the situation at hand, and
thus, replacement of all siding on all elevations of Windridge’s
buildings was the proper way to make Windridge truly whole again.181
PART III: OTHER COURTS’ APPROACHES IN INTERPRETING
SIMILAR REPLACEMENT-COST POLICY LANGUAGE

177
178

Id.
Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 416-417

(2017).
179

Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 2019).
180
Supra note 178 at *417.
181
See Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1042.
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State courts have consistently been split when addressing
replacement-cost policy language.182 Recently, however, there has
been a trend toward interpreting ambiguous provisions to require
“matching.”183 In an attempt to provide some uniformity to the
controversy, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”) drafted a model law, entitled the “Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act” that addresses replacement-cost policy language.184 The
NAIC Model Rules propose the following regulation for states to
adopt:
A. When the policy provides for the adjustment and
settlement of first party losses based on replacement cost, the
following shall apply:
(1) When a loss requires repair or replacement of an item or
part, any consequential physical damage incurred in making
such repair or replacement not otherwise excluded by the
policy, shall be included in the loss. The insured shall not
have to pay for betterment nor any other cost except for the
applicable deductible.
(2) When a loss requires replacement of items and the
replaced items do not match in quality, color or size, the
insurer shall replace all items in the area so as to conform to a
reasonably uniform appearance. This applies to interior and
exterior losses. The insured shall not bear any cost over the
applicable deductible, if any.185

182

Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge I”), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62690, at *7; see Windridge II, 932 F.3d at
1040.
183
Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1040.
184
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 902-1, § 9 (1997).
185
Id. (emphasis added).
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The purpose of this model regulation was “to set forth minimum
standards” for the investigation of replacement-cost policy claims;
however, that did not include providing for a private cause of
action.186 To this day, most states do not have regulations in which an
individual homeowner or insured could exercise a private right of
action under the state’s unfair claims settlement practices act.187 That
being said, several states have still passed statutes and regulations in
order to match the NAIC model law, including Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, and Vermont.188 Of course, the
specific requirements for insurers in such regulations vary from state
to state.
For example, Alaska, California, and Iowa have adopted the
“reasonably uniform appearance” language provided by the NAIC
while other states have provided slightly different wording.189 Ohio,
however, would replace the relevant language with the phrase
“reasonably comparable appearance,” which suggests more latitude.190
In fact, in Ohio, “reasonable comparable appearance” has been
interpreted to incorporate the idea of “matching within time,” in which
the insured must present evidence “beyond his mere opinion” that the
replacement, while not exact, would not result in a “reasonable
comparable appearance” over time.191 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit,
applying Ohio law, seemed to suggest the this “reasonable comparable
appearance” is actually a low threshold for insurers and a high burden

186

Id. at § 2.
Id.
188
See Alaska Admin Code tit. 3 § 26.090; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, § 2695.9;
C.G.S.A. § 38a-316e; F.S.A. § 626.9744; I.C.A. § 191-15.44(1)(b); O.A.C. Ann. §
3901-1-54(I)(1)(b); Vermont Department of Financial Regulation Reg. I-1979-2
(Fair Claims Practices).
189
See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 902-1, § 9
(1997).
190
See O.A.C Ann. § 3901-1-54.
191
See Zinser v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., CA 2016-08-144, 2017 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2721 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2017).
187
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for insureds.192 In Wright v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, the
court stated “[A]lthough unweathered shakes would not exactly match
the color of weathered shakes, the roofer does not claim that
replacement shakes would not match after weathering naturally. It is
uncontested that unweathered replacement shakes, after a reasonable
amount of time, would weather to match the old shakes.”193 For the
Wright court, without any evidence or expert opinion from the insured,
to hold otherwise would “create an extreme blanket rule requiring the
entire replacement of any damaged shake roof.”194
Other states have chosen to steer away from regulating this matter
specifically, but rather, choose to rely on general contract principles.
Arizona, for example, chooses to interpret replacement-cost policy
language in the realm of the reasonable expectations doctrine.195 “The
reasonable expectations doctrine relieves an insured from “certain
clauses of an agreement which he did not negotiate, probably did not
read, and probably would not have understood had he read
them.”196 In Trudel v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,
the specific policy included a provision indicating that the insurance
company would not pay to replace undamaged property due to
mismatch between the new material and the undamaged materials,
which probably was the insurer’s attempt to be proactive in the
“matching” litigation world.197 The District of Arizona held that such a
provision remained susceptible to the reasonable expectations
doctrine, which ultimately stated that “a contract term is not enforced
if one party has reason to believe that the other would not have
asserted to the contract if it had known of that term.”198
192

See Wright v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 555 F. Appx. 575, 579 (6th Cir.

2014).
193

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
195
Trudel v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV-12-1208-PHX-SMM, 2014
WL 4053405 (D. Ariz. Aug 15, 2014).
196
State Farm Fire & Cas. In. Co. v. Grabowski, 214 Ariz. 188, 192 (Ariz.
App. 2007).
197
Trudel, 2014 WL 4053405 at *7.
198
Id. at *8.
194
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Such an approach is similar to the Seventh Circuit’s alternative
support for its holding—interpretation of ambiguities should be
construed in favor of the insured—but goes even farther by honoring
the intent of the beneficiaries regarding the contract terms even when
an ambiguity is not officially present.199 The reasonable expectations
doctrine is perhaps most beneficial for the insured’s position since (1)
it can be used as a support in a private cause of action and (2) it
adequately sheds light on the real crux of the issue—did the insured
know when they took out the replacement-cost policy that they would
not be receiving full replacement coverage under the circumstances?
Indiana’s approach toward interpreting the replacement-cost
policy language in Windridge clarifies a solution to the subjectivism of
aesthetic mismatch arguments.200 The Indiana Appellate Court in Erie
Insurance Exchange v. Sams held the insurer was required to fully
replace undamaged shingles on a roof in order to establish an aesthetic
match according to the replacement-cost policy only after experts
testified that the mismatched shingles would, in fact, lower the
property’s value.201
States adopting a different analysis from the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis include Alabama,202 Nebraska,203 and Texas.204 In these
states, “direct physical loss to covered property” does not necessarily
mean that if a building is listed as covered property, the building as a
whole has not experienced a direct physical loss. For example, as
recently as 2019, the Northern District of Texas found that “physical

199

See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 827.
200
See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Sams, 20 N.E.3d 182, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
201
Id.
202
See Graffeo v. State Farm Fire & Cas., Inc., 628 So.2d 790 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993).
203
See Eledge v. Farmers Mut. Home Ins. Co. of Hooper, Nebraska, 571
N.W.2d 105 (Neb. App. 1997).
204
See All Saints Catholic Church v. United Nat. Ins. Co., 257 S.W.3d 800
(Tex. App. 2008).
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loss” cannot be held to encompass a loss that is not physically
damaged.205 The court went on to say:
The requirement that the loss be ‘physical,’ given the
ordinary definition of that term is widely held to exclude
alleged losses that are intangible or incorporeal, and, thereby,
to preclude any claim against the property insurer when the
insured merely suffers a detrimental economic impact
unaccompanied by a distinct, demonstrable, physical
alteration of the property.206
In other words, the insurer would not be required to replace
admittedly undamaged property.207 And, of course, for the states that
have not chosen to fully endorse a “matching” regulation, insurers
may still want to clarify their policies.208
205

Ross v. Hartford Lloyd Ins. Co., No. 4:18-CV-00541-O, 2019 WL
2929761, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 4, 2019).
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
The states of Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have not directly addressed “matching” arguments in the
replacement-cost policy language debate present in Windridge. See below for a list
of case citations which attempt to tackle the issue in other states, not addressed in
this paper:
Colorado:
Hamlet Condo. Ass’n v. Am. Mut. Family Ins. Co., 2016
CV 30594 (Co. Dist. Ct., April 12, 2017).
Georgia:
Lam v. Allstate Indem. Co., 755 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. App.
2014)
Kentucky:
Woods Apts., LLC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105582 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
Louisiana:
Holloway v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 290 So.2d 791
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
Minnesota:
Trout Brook S. Condo. Ass’n v. Harleysville Worcester
Ins. Co., 995 F. Supp.2d 1035 (D. Minn. 2014).
Michigan:
Bernert v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 10- 12359,
2012 WL 1060089, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2012).
Pennsylvania:
Enwereji v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 10-CV4967,
2011 WL 3240866 (E.D. Pa., July 28, 2011); Greene v.
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PART IV: WINDRIDGE’S IMPACT MOVING FORWARD
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Windridge was, of course, one
of first impression for the court, as the Illinois Supreme Court had yet
to address the issue and establish controlling precedent.209 As stated by
Windridge in their brief, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case
would necessarily be “outcome determinative” and the issue would
likely continue to “recur in other cases.”210 The Seventh Circuit’s
decision, reflective of the national trend in such cases,211 most likely
reflects what the Illinois Supreme Court would have decided and
established a few good policies moving forward.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision, in its logical approach to
determining the specific meaning of certain policy language, promoted
transparency in property insurance contracting. A common problem in
insurance policy drafting has been the overabundant use of standard,
boiler-plate language, which although making perfect sense to
insurers, leaves policyholders seeking interpretation guidance.212 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky best identified the prevalent ambiguity
problems, stating:

U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 936 A.2d 1178 (Pa.
Super. 2007).
Tennessee:
Hutcherson v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. of Columbia,
1986 WL 9608 (Tenn. App. Ct., Sept. 3, 1986).
West Virginia: D’Annunzio v. Security-Conn. Life Ins. Co., 410
S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1991).
209
See Windridge Brief, supra note 126, at 8.
210
Id. at 29.
211
See id. at 8 (“the clear trend is to recognize that matching is required with
replacement-cost policies.”).
212
There is a suggestion that insurance policy drafters value boilerplate
language, not because they necessarily expect to confuse consumers, but because
they believe that courts will understand it and thus, ironically rely on court precedent
when asking for support of ambiguous phrases. Boardman, supra note 115, at 1106.
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Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite
tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies. Most are a
virtually impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity.
It seems that insurers generally are attempting to convince the
customer when selling the policy that everything is covered
and convince the court when a claim is made that nothing is
covered. The miracle of it all is that the English language can
be subjected to such abuse and still remain an instrument of
communication.213
However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reflects a fair way to
interpret such ambiguity, leaving room for insurers to amend their
contractual insurance policy provisions to reflect what they really want
to cover, while also, in the meantime, leaving room for insureds to
find full replacement under their current policy. As many courts have
acknowledged, absent sophistication of the insured, when the insurer
has the greater bargaining power, he should also bear the burden of
clearly defining the policy’s provisions.214 Having the drafters bear
this burden incentivizes them to write clear policies that ultimately
benefit insureds and courts alike, as badly drafted insurance policies
can “increase the price of contracts . . . strain business relationships,
and sometimes even forfeit the financial security that the insurance
requirements are meant to obtain for the contracting parties.”215
Additionally, the more motivation that insurers have to steer away
from such boiler-plate language, the less likely other insurers will
suffer for ambiguous policy language. “After all, it is industry standard
213

Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616,
622–23 (Ky. 1970).
214
See e.g., Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm  if this is supposed to
be “committee” otherwise spell out., 139 Ill. 2d 24, 72 (1990) (“A contractual clause
that is part of a ‘boilerplate’ agreement . . . has its significance greatly reduced
because of the inequality in the parties’ bargaining power.”).
215
Karen Erger, Think Before You Ink: Insurance Matters Find Out How to
Draft Appropriate, Attainable Insurance Requirements in Contracts and Why
Consulting the Client’s Insurance Agent Before Putting Pen to Paper Can Help You
Avoid Trouble, 99 ILL. B.J. 317, 317 (2011).
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to use the [Insurance Services Office or ISO] forms, not an individual
decision for which the executive would be held accountable.”216
Insurance drafters might certainly hesitate to “strik[e] out on [their]
own,” as this could lead to more exposure to potential liability, but, as
Michelle Boardman suggested:
The industry that drafts together, sticks together, not just for
future drafting, but for the pooling of loss data that comes in
on the first draft. From insurers, therefore, improvement will
lie not in more individualized innovation, but in more
industrywide redrafting. What should be discarded in the end
is not the standardized policy supported by mass actuarial
data, but those interpretive rules that create perverse
incentives to retain weak language and create secret
meaning.217
And yet, one major criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Windridge lies in its failure to define the boundaries of “aesthetic
matching.” In other words, if we read these general replacement-cost
policies as providing coverage for aesthetic matching, where do we
draw the line?
The Seventh Circuit seemed to only briefly acknowledge this
concern in a few sentences and a footnote.218 The Seventh Circuit
indicated that it was “common sense” that “[i]f one shingle at the
corner of a slate roof is damaged and no matching replacement shingle
is available, a building owner would not be entitled to an entire new
roof.”219 In the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical scenario, Windridge’s
particular policy would allow PIIC to merely compensate Windridge
for the minor “decrease in value of the building due to one non-

216

Boardman, supra note 115, at 1128.
Id.
218
Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
(“Windridge II”), 932 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 2019).
219
Id.
217
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matching shingle.”220 Perhaps the existence of this option for PIIC led
the Seventh Circuit to avoid a rabbit hole of hypothetical situations
inquiring as to where aesthetic matching might end. But although
brief, the Seventh Circuit was correct in noting that PIIC’s policy
would not allow Windridge to receive a windfall profit, as the “like
kind and quality” provision does not entitle the insured to a windfall
profit.
First, in Illinois, “like kind and quality” means a restoration to the
pre-loss condition.221 If the damage to the insured property can be
easily segregated to a specific area, particularly one with notable
physical boundaries, then the replacement will be confined to that
area, as the “building-as-a-whole” type argument by Windridge would
no longer apply.222
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit would later illustrate its
conclusion in Villas at Winding Ridge v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company,223 which it decided just a few months after Windridge.224 In
that case, the plaintiff asserted that replacing one shingle would
require replacing all shingles under its replacement-cost policy.225 The
Seventh Circuit disagreed.226 According to the Seventh Circuit,
Gutkowski v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance
Company,227 which was used as support by the plaintiffs in that case,
was distinguishable.228 In Gutkowski, complete replacement was
required because evidence suggested that “replacing the top layer of
damaged composition shingles would necessarily damage the
220

Id.
See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 143 (2005).
222
See generally CLARK SCHIRLE, Measuring Damage In A Megaloss If “Like
Kind and Quality” Does Not Exist, in 26 THE BRIEF 31 (2006).
223
942 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2019).
224
While Windridge was decided on August 7, 2019, Villas at Winding Ridge
was decided on November 8, 2019. See id.; Windridge II, 932 F.3d at 1035.
225
Villas at Winding Ridge, 942 F.3d at 833.
226
Id.
227
176 P.3d 1232, 1234 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007).
228
Villas at Winding Ridge, 942 F.3d at 833.
221
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underlying wooden shingles.”229 The plaintiff in Villas at Winding
Ridge, could not present any such evidence, and therefore the Seventh
Circuit, quoting its own opinion in Windridge, denied that complete
replacement of the roof would be necessary in that case.230 Essentially,
where there is no evidence that a repair or replacement would devalue
the home, the argument for complete replacement is weak and often
unwarranted. While a replacement may risk placing insured in a
slightly better position, it certainly has never been required to put
them in a better position, and the fact-intensive analysis that considers
whether or not property value has been reduced is not something that
courts decide.231 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit recognized the idea
that, “[t]he psychology of the market place, which assigns a lesser
value to an adequately and competently repaired [property], has
nothing to do with the ‘quality’ of the repair itself.”232

CONCLUSION
Although only time will tell, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Windridge will likely encourage other jurisdictions to follow a
contractual approach to interpreting similar replacement-cost policy
language, particularly in the states where courts have yet to directly
address the issue. While Illinois might still benefit from implementing
a statutory regulation to provide more clarity to the matter, the
insured’s private cause of action is strengthened by the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Windridge. The Seventh Circuit gave the
replacement-cost policy phrase “direct physical loss to covered
property” a fair interpretation, and insurers would be wise to take
notice—before they meet their match.
229

Id.
Id.
231
See 5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 47.05
(2019).
232
See Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 788 So. 3d 355, 360 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
230
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